Motivated by the application of private statistical analysis of large databases, we consider the problem of selective private function evaluation (SPFE). In this problem, a client interacts with one or more servers holding copies of a database z = zt,...,z, in order to compute f (z~t,...,z~,,,) , for some function f and indices i = it,...,i,~ chosen by the client. Ideally, the client must learn nothing more about the database than f(zit,..., zi,,~), and the servers should learn nothing.
INTRODUCTION
Companies regularly use third-party databases in order to gain access to information used to guide their business decisions and product development. For example, it might be f is applied. (Solutions where the servers should not learn even f can be obtained by letting f be a 'universal function' and allowing the client to specify the actual function to be evaluated via some additional private input to f.) [n the context of the private statistics application discussed above, SPFE protocols address the following privacy concerns:
(1) Protect clients from revealing what type of sample population, what type of specific data about this sample, and possibly also what function of the selected items, they are after;
(2) Protect database owners from revealing a large amount of information about their data or providing a higher quality service than what a client has paid for.
Related work
Secure computation.
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) [45, 28, 10, 14] is a powerful and general cryptographic primitive. It allows two or more parties to jointly compute some function of their inputs while hiding their inputs from each other. SPFE may be cast as a special case of the general secure MPC problem. Thus, generic secure 2-party protocols [45, 28, 26] , whose communication complexity is linear in the size of a circuit being evaluated, are sufficient to obtain some solution to our problem. However, since a circuit computing the SPFE functionality must be at least of the size of the database, the communication complexity of these generic solutions will be (at least) linear in n, making them infeasible when the database is large. In contrast, our main goal is to obtain solutions for the SPFE problem whose communication complexity is sublinear in the database size when m <~<~ n.
Private information retrieval. The study of sublinearcommunication secure computation originated from the problem of private information retrieval (PIR), introduced in [17] .
A P[R protocol allows a client to retrieve a selected item from a database while hiding the identity of this item from the server holding the database. The main goal of P[Rrelated research has been to minimize the communication complexity of P|R, which is measured by default as the cost of retrieving one out of n bits. (Note that a P[R protocol with n communication bits can be trivially realized by sending the entire database to the client.) Under specific number-theoretic intractability assumptions, it is possible to construct PIR protocols with a very low asymptotic communication complexity [32, 34, 43, 12] , as low as polynomial in log n and the security parameter [12] . An alternative setting for PIR assumes that the database is replicated among multiple servers, and only requires the client's privacy to hold against restricted collusions of servers [17, 4, 16, 31, 7] . In this setting, it is possible to achieve information-theoretic privacy with sublinear communication.
While the asymptotic communication complexity of the latter multi-server protocols is generally worse than that of single-server protocols, they are significantly more efficient in computation, and even their communication complexity is typically lower for practical database sizes.
PiR is not concerned with the privacy of the database.
The problem of symmetrically private information retrieval (SPIR) , introduced in [25] , is an extension of PIR where the client is restricted to learn no more than a single data item. 1 Using constructions from [25, 43, 36, 37] , SPIR protocols 1SPIR is almost synonymous to the well-known notion of can be obtained from PIR protocols with a small complexity overhead. We use SPIR(n, m, l) to denote a more general version of the problem, in which m items are retrieved from the same database of n l-bit items. While this primitive can be implemented by ml independent invocations of SPIR(n, 1,1), significantly more efficient implementations are possible [36, 37, 8] . Most of our constructions will utilize the SPIR primitive as a black box. Thus, we will generally not be concerned with the specifics of its implementation. Following the work on PIR, sublinear-communication secure MPC protocols were studied both in other specific contexts (e.g., [33, 22] ) and in more general contexts [35] . The latter work aims at transforming a general protocol in the communication complexity model into a secure protocol with a low communication overhead. While SPI=E can be viewed as a special case of the above problem, our solutions for this special case are more efficient than the ones in [35] .
Inference control in statistical databases. For completeness, we briefly contrast SPFE with the extensive body of literature on inference control (IC) in statistical databases (see, e.g., [2] for a survey). The goal of [C is to provide clients with access to a database for computing aggregate statistics about a collection of individuals while protecting the confidentiality of each individual in the database. The attacker is a client who attempts to infer some previously unknown data about an individual in the database by performing one or more allowed queries. SPFE differs from IC in several ways, most fundamentally in its different privacy goals: SPFE is concerned with hiding client queries and limiting database disclosure, rather than limiting inferences about individuals in the database. These contrasting sets of goals can lead to conflicting solutions. For example, inference controls in statistical databases include query set restriction (see [2, Section 3] and [19, Chapter 6] ), whereby the database monitors the query set of each query --i.e., the subset of records included in the computation of the response to the query --and limits the query set size, the overlap of query sets in successive queries by the same client, etc. In contrast, the query set is required to be hidden from the database in SPI=F. On the other hand, inference controls in which the database itself is perturbed to protect the privacy of individuals (see [2, Section 4] ) could be applied to a database using SPI=F.
Our results
As in the PlR-related literature, we consider both a singleserver model and a model where the database is replicated among several servers. The primary performance measures for an SPFF protocol are:
(1) The number o£servers. We find the single-server setting generally more appealing, since servers are arguably the most crucial resource, and, as noted above, the multi-server model does not protect the client from large collusions of servers. (We note though that our solutions for the singleserver setting can be adapted to the multi-server setting, allowing more efficiency in other parameters.)
oblivious transfer (OT) [42, 44, 21] . We use the terminology of SPIR to indicate that: (1) we are mostly interested in the case that the number of items is large and the communication is sublinear in the number of items; (2) we consider both a single-server and a multi-server model; (3)like in the PIR literature, we allow some relaxations to the most stringent security definitions of OT.
(2) Communication and computation costs. We treat the communication complexity as the most significant complexity measure (excluding the number of servers). However, some of our protocols will also be fine-tuned for optimizing the computation. We will usually specify the complexity of our solutions in terms of other primitives (SPIR, generic secure MPC, encryption) rather than in absolute terms. By substituting specific implementations of these primitives, one may get a concrete sense of the actual costs. Finally, while we still use big-O notation in our complexity analysis, the underlying constants will typically be very small.
(3) The number of communication rounds. We define a round to consist of a message from the client to each server followed by a reply from each server to the client. To achieve provable security against malicious clients, our protocols may require an additional preprocessing phase or certified public keys (as in, e.g., [11] ).
Notions of security. In addition to the performance parameters, we consider the following security characteristics of a solution. First, security can be either computational (i.e., based on cryptographic assumptions and computational limitations of the parties) or absolute (information-theoretic). Our solutions will guarantee that the client obtains the correct values only when all servers follow their protocol. Still, our multi-server solutions can be easily generalized to provide fault tolerance as well. The client's privacy is guaranteed even when up to some threshold of servers, referred to as the privacy threshold, are malicious, i.e., deviate from their protocol in an arbitrary way. In bounding the amount of information gathered by a malicious client, we distinguish three levels of security. (1) Strong security guarantees that the client learns only the value of the public function / on some sequence of m data items. (2) Weak security only guarantees that the client learns the value of some function f' on some sequence of rrt data items, where the function f is determined by the client's actions; however, /' is guaranteed to have the same output size as f. The latter ensures that only a small amount of information about the database is leaked. Thus, the weaker notion of security is sufficient to address most privacy concerns that SPFE resolves. (3) Finally, some of our protocols provide no provable security against malicious clients. Yet, these are provably secure against a semi-honest client, who follows the protocol but tries to learn additional information from its view, and may also be heuristically weakly secure against a malicious client.
Our solutions. We aim at obtaining SPFE protocols that are not only asymptotically efficient, but are also feasible in practice. We present several protocols, where each is best suited to particular settings.
In Section 3.1, we present a one-round multi-server information-theoretic SPFE protocol. Its construction is based on a reduction to multivariate polynomial evaluation. This protocol is most appealing when f is very simple (e.g., the sum function) and when a large number of servers are available, as might be the case if data replication is used for fault tolerance or as part of a content distribution mechanism. A significant advantage of this protocol is that it involves very short messages from the servers to the client. Thus, this protocol can be used to compute several statistics on the same data set, or the same statistic over different periods of time, with little additional cost.
In Section 3.2, we present a one-round SPFE protocol for general functions, whose construction relies on private simultaneous messages protocols (described therein). The advantages of this protocol over subsequent single-server protocols are its optimal round complexity and its strong security against a malicious client. In Section 3.3, we present three reductions of SPFE to general secure MPC and SPIR. None of the three provides strong security against a malicious client. Moreover, even if used in conjunction with a round-optimal secure MPC protocol, they all require at least one additional round in comparison to the previous protocol. However, one advantage of these solutions is that they all efficiently scale to the case where jr is represented by an arithmetic circuit over a large modulus (rather than a Boolean circuit). When / is viewed as an integer-or real-valued function, this often allows for smaller circuits and better efficiency. An important additional advantage of the second and third reductions is that they only require a single invocation of SPIR(n, m, l) (retrieving m out of n items) rather than m invocations of SPIR(n, 1,t) on ra different databases. This may result in significant efficiency improvements. In particular, the latter provably requires f~(mn) computation on the server's part, whereas the server's computation in the former can be made aLmost linear in n (cf. [36, 37, 8] ). The third reduction typicaJly involves more communication and less computation than the second, but does not provide provable security against a malicious client. We complement the above reductions by presenting a light-weight protocol for secure MPC of general arithmetic circuits; this protocol is compatible with our notion of weak security against a malicious client.
Finally, in Section 4, we specifically consider some useful instances of privacy-protecting statistical analysis, discuss the application of our general solutions to these instances, and present protocols that are tailored to these cases. In particular, we obtain an efficient one-round protocol for the special case where f is the sum function. Table 1 summarizes the efficiency of our general singleserver solutions in terms of the SPIR and MPC primitives they rely on. (The third row of the table describes two variants of the same approach; additional variants are discussed in Section 3.3.) The complexity coblmn refers to the case of a Boolean function f: {0, 1}" --~ {0, 11, where C! is the size of a Boolean circuit computing f. This cob~mn describes both the communication and computation costs (omitting insignificant factors). 2 SPIR(n, n;,t) denotes the cost of retrieving m out of n &bit items using a 1-roundSPIR protocol, MPC(m, s) denotes the cost of a 1-round secure 9.. party computation of an m-input, s-gate Boolean circuit, and s denotes a security parameter. (In practice, ~; can be instantiated by the length of an encryption key; see Section 2 for a more formal treatment.) Using Yao's technique [46] , the cost of MPC(ra, s) is m x SPIR(2, 1, ~) -t-OQ¢. s). s
The main advantages of each protocol are summarized above. When comparing their complexity, it is helpfnl to keep the following qualitative facts in mind: (1) SPIR(n, m, l) can be implemented more efficiently than m invocations of SPIR(n, 1, l); (2) The best known PIR protocol [19. ] is not well adapted to retrieving multi-bit items; consequently, the 2The computation in the two protocols from Section 3.3.2 in-2 volves O(m log n) additional modular multiplications. This overhead can be asymptotically reduced, see Section 3.3.2. SThis applies to some relaxation of the definition of secure MPC, discussed in Section 2. best known implementation of SPIR(n, 1,1) is significantly more efficient than SPIR(n, 1, ~), even when ~; is as small as the si~.e of a key. 4 Finally, in the security column, "None*" indicates provable security against a semi-honest client, that also appears (but is not proven to be) weakly secure against a malicious client. For our protocols to be provably secure against a malicious client with the specified round complexity, one should either assume an idealized '%lack-box" implementation of the SPIR primitive, or make some additional requirements which are satisfied by known implementations of this primitive. This applies to all protocols described in Table 1 . Additional security-related issues are discussed in Section 2.
PRELIMINAI~WS
We define secure schemes for selective private function evaluation (SPFE). The problem is a special case of the general problem of secure function evaluation. Thus, in principle, the general definitions (as in, say, [26, 13] ) apply here as well. Nonetheless, here we provide an explicit, simplified and relaxed definition for the special case of SPFE. The definition deals with the case of multiple servers. The singleserver case is obtained as a special case.
Let k,n, ~;,t E N, let D be some finite domain (called the data domain), and let [n] denote the set {1,...,n}. There are k + 1 parties, the client C and k servers $1,... , Sk. The servers have a common input z E D ~' representing the data, and the client has a (deterministic) function f : D '~ -+ D where nt _< n, and a list I E [n] "~ of m indices. The function is given using some standard representation, e.g. via a circuit that evaluates it. In addition, all parties have a security parameter ~. The servers also have a common random input, which can be regarded as an extension of the def database. The client wishes to learn f(zl), where zx : (zil,... ,zi,,,), while making sure that any collusion of up to t servers learns nothing. Sometimes it will be allowed, or even required, that the servers learn f or I or some partial information about them. The servers wish to make sure that the value learned by the client is a 'qegitimate" one, where legitimacy may be interpreted in a number of ways.
All parties are assumed to be polynomial in ~.s For the sake of nnlformity, we formulate our security requirements only against polynomial-time adversaries. Nonetheless, in the case where there are multiple servers, security will hold even ag~nst computationally unbounded adversaries. 4In contrast, SPIR(2,1, ~) can be implemented in practice with the same cost as SPIR(2, 1, 1) when ~ is small. SThis implies that n, the length of the database, must be at most polynomial in ~. When security is desired even against adversaries that are sub-exponential in the security parameter, one can allow n and ~ to vary more (see, e.g., [12] ).
A bit more specifically (but still informally), we make three requirements. The first is Correctness, which states that as long as the client and the servers follow the protocol then the client's output will be the correct value f(zz). The second is Client Privacy, which states that no adversary (that controls up to t servers) will learn anything from the interaction, except possibly some pre-defined information, even if the corrupted servers deviate from the protocol in an arbitrary way. We model the information that the servers are allowed to learn about the client's input in a way described below. By default, this information will include the function f and the list size m but not the actual list I. The third is Database Secrecy, which states that the client learns only a predefmed amount of information about the data, even if it arbitrarily deviates from its protocol.
While correctness is quite straightforward to formulate, formalizing the other two is a bit more problematic. Client Privacy is formalized by requiring that there exists an algorithm (a simulator) that generates a distribution that is indistinguishable from the view of the servers corrupted by the adversary. This view includes their inputs, random inputs, and messages they receive. By default we require computationalindisting~dshability between the two distributions, parameterized by the security parameter ~. However, our multi-server protocols will provide information-theoretic client privacy, where the simulator's output is identical to the servers' view. The simulator is given the data z and the value of some pre-defmed function h applied to the client's input. (Again, by default h(f, I) = f where (f, I) is the client's input.)
Database Secrecy is captured as follows. Fix some subset A of all functions from D '~ to D. We think of A as the set of "allowable functions", or in other words the set of functions that the client is allowed to apply to the database. We require that for any adversary J4 controlling the client there exists a simulator M with the following characteristics. The goal of M is to generate an output that is distributed indistinguishably from the output of .A. However, M does not interact with the servers; instead it interacts with a "trusted party" T that has the following functionality. T receives from M a description of a function g E A. In return, T outputs g(z). It is stressed that M can invoke T only once. Intuitively, this requirement captures the property that a malicious client can learn the value of any function g E A of its choice, applied to the data x.
In the case of a malicious client, our protocols (except where noted previously) satisfy the database secrecy requirement with respect to one of the following two possible sets A of allowable functions. Weak security refers to the case where A is the set of all functions that depend on at most m locations in the database and output a value from D.
Strong security refers to the case where A = {g(x) : f(xz) I
z c [n], IZl = ~}, and f is the function that appears in the client's input. Our basic protocols do not guarantee correctness against malicious servers (indeed, in the singleserver case such a requirement is quite meaningless). Client Privacy and, in some cases, Database Secrecy will be guaranteed even against malicious adversaries. For lack of space, we omit more formal definitions from this extended abstract.
On the definition of SPIR. Most of our constructions use symmetrically private information retrieval (SPIR) as a subroutine. SPIR can be defined as a special case of SPFE, where the input of the client is restricted so that f is the identity function and I is a singleton (i.e., m = 1). We use SPIR(n,m,£) to denote a generalization of this primitive allowing the client to select m out of n items of length £. Sometimes the parameter l will be replaced by the data domain D, or by * when it is clear from context. By default, SPIR will refer to 1-round SPIR.
On the definition of secure MPC. Another subroutine that win be used by our constructions is general secure MPC. Similarly to the SPFF defmition, our definition for secure MPC relaxes the standard ones from [13, 26] in that it does not require correctness if a server is malicious, s Also, similarly to SPFF it is possible to define a notion of general secure 2-party computation with a weak security against a malicious client. These relaxations allow for more efficient implementations of secure 2-party computation, which do not require the server to prove the validity of its actions.
Homomorphic encryption. Some of our protocols rely on the standard tool of homomorphic encryption. A homomorphic encryption scheme is an encryption scheme in which the plaintexts are taken from a group G, and given encryptions of two group elements one can efficiently compute a (randomized) encryption of their sum. Since this computation usually involves a modular multiplication of the encryptious, we write E(a) . E(b) = E(a + b). It follows that E(a) ° = E(c-a) for c e N. The Ooldwasser-~c~ scheme [29] satisfies this property with G = g2. For more a more detailed definition of this primitive, as well as examples of such schemes with larger homomorphism groups g,,, the reader may refer to [9, 39, 40, 41] .
GENERAL SOLUTIONS

Multi-server protocols based on multivariate polynomial evaluation
In this section we present an information-theoretically secure solution to SPFF when the database z is replicated at multiple servers. For simplicity of presentation, here we assume a semi-honest client (but allow up to t malicious servers); this solution can be extended to address a malicious client at a moderate additional cost using techniques from [25] .
Our solution builds from the following lemma, which follows immediately from work in instance hiding [5] :
Consider a system of k servers, and let P be an 5-variate polynomial over a field F of total degree d. Suppose that P is known to all servers but is unknown to °Technically, in the Client Privacy requirement we only compare the view of the simulator to the view of the servers, whereas in the analogous requirement from [13, 26] In the protocol of Lemma 1, the values returned by the servers lie on a degree-dr polynomial ]5 such that/b(0) is the client's desired answer. Specifically, the answer of server h is equal to P(~h), where ~i,..., ~ are some (f=ed) distinct, non-zero elements of F. Following [25] , we can thus extend this protocol to achieve symmetric privacy if server h instead returns P(rvh)-t-R(cth) for a random degree-dr polynomial R where R(0) = 0. R must be shared by the servers in advance; though inconvenient, some form of correlated random values is necessary to achieve symmetric privacy in the informationtheoretic setting [25] .
The solution of this section is thus to express f as a multivariate polynomial P over F that depends on z, and whose value at indices Q,..., i,n encoded in F is Y(zil,--., zi~). Then, we can apply Lemma 1 to obtain the construction. Here we outline how to construct P from a Boolean formula ¢ computing f, where ¢ consists of binary (2- (1),..., i, (t), i~ (1),..., i~ (t) .... , i~,(1),..., i~,(t) 
Note that since deg(Pg) ~ deg(Pg.,,ft) + deg(Pg.~;sht), the total degree of P satisfies deg(P) < ls, and so applying Lemma 1 yields a construction with k = tls + 1 servers. This theorem is most interesting in the ease when f E NC t where we get an SPFE protocol with m°(1)tlogn servers.
Note that the above construction actually applies to any function f which can be efficiently computed 7 by a degree-s 7If computational efficiency is not a requirement, then s = m is sufficient for any Boolean function f. polynomial over F, where IFI > t s l o g n + 1. Hence, if f is the sum function (outputting the sum of its m inputs over F), Theorem 2 applies with s = 1.
Finally, we remark that standard techniques allow a tradeoff between the number of servers for efficiency and fault tolerance. Specifically, a savings of a factor of c in the number of servers can be obtained by increasing the communication by roughly a factor of 2 ¢, and t' malicious servers can be tolerated by adding 2t' additional servers.
Solutions based on private simultaneous messages protocols
In this section, we construct protocols for SPFE by applying a SPIR protocol on top of a protocol for f in the socalled private simultaneous messages (PSM) model [23, 30] .
We start by describing the PSM model, and then discuss its application to our problem. In the PSM model, there are m players PI,---, P,,~ and an external referee. Each player P# holds an input Yi, and all of them share access to a common random input r, which is lmknown to the referee. The players' goal is to securely evaluate a given function f of their inputs by having each player Pi send a single message pj to the referee, where p~ is determined by yj and r alone. That is, the referee should be able to reconstruct the value f ( y l , . . . , ym) from the m messages it receives, but should learn no additional information about the inputs y l , . . . , y,,,.
Motivated by efficiency considerations, we slightly refine the above setting. In addition to the m players P1,..-, pro, our variant of the model includes an additional player P0 who holds no input. The message p0 computed by P0 is determined only by the random input r. In the usual PSM scenario this extension of the model seems useless, since the extra player P0 can be simulated by the other players at no additional cost. However, in our context it is beneficial to shift as much communication as possible to the extra message po. We say that a PSM protocol has communication complexity (a,/3) if the length of each message p~, j > 0, is bounded by a, and the length of the extra message p0 is bounded by/3. Due to space considerations, we omit a detailed formalization of this definition.
The following example describes a simple and useful PSM protocol for the modular sum function.
EXAMPLE I. Let Z , denote the additive group of residues modulo u, where u is an l-bit integer. Consider the function f : Z~ --r T~ outputting the sum of its m inputs. A PSM protocol for f with communication complexity (£, 0) proceeds as follows. The common random input contains independent random group elements rl , . . . , rm-1. The messages are defined by p# = y# + r#, I <_ j <_ m, where r,, = -(ra + ... + rm-a). It is clear that the referee can reconstruct the output by adding all m messages, and it is not hard to verify that the messages are random subject to the restriction that they add up to the sum of the inputs.
To construct an SPFE protocol from a PSM protocol for f , the servers will simulate the rn q-1 players of the PSM protocol, and the client will simulate the referee. Our goal is to allow the client to efficiently obtain the m + 1 PSM messages corresponding to its selected inputs x i x , . . . , xi,~.
We formulate the protocol for the general t-private kserver case. When k > 1, this allows us to obtain in_formation-theoretic security for the client. The building blocks are: (1) a (1-round) t-secure k-server SPIR protocol and (2) a PSM protocol 7 ) computing f.
The SPFE protocol proceeds as follows: (1) If k ----1, the server picks a random input r for the PSM protocol 7); otherwise, such an r is taken from the servers' common randomness. (2) For each j, 1 <_ j _< m, each server computes an n-item virtual database in which the i-th item is the message which player Pj would send in 7) on input zi and random input r; the client retrieves the i#-th item from the virtual database using the SPIR protocol. (3) The first server computes the extra message p0 from r, and sends it to the client in the clear. (4) By simulating the referee in 7), the client computes the value of f from the m + 1 PSM-messages it obtained.
Note that all m + I messages sent in steps 2,3 can be simultaneously sent to the client. Letting SPIR(n, 1, c~) denote the communication complexity of the SPIR protocol, we have: 
where (a,/3) is the communication complexity of 7). It provides strong security against a malicious client. Perfect (information-theoretic) security is achievable for both sides using
perfectly secure PSM and SPIR protocols.
We conclude this section by substituting known upper bounds on the complexity of PSM protocols in both the computational and information-theoretic setting. Let C! (resp., B ! ) be the size of a circuit (resp., branching program) computing f. In [23, 46] , a computationally secure PSM protocol with communication complexity (to, O(~-C1)) is given and in [30] , a perfectly secure PSM protocol with communication complexity (O(B~), 0) is given. We denote the cost of a oneround SPIR protocol using k servers by SPIRk and the cost of a one-one perfectly secure SPIR protocol using k servers by PSPIRh. Using these protocols, we obtain the following reductions from SPFE to SPIR: 
Solutions based on general secure multiparty computation
In this section we present several reductions of the SPFE problem to SPIR and general secure MPC. We focus on the single-server case, and assume that the data domain D is some additive group 7/.~, (where u = 2 in the default Boolean case).
We break down the problem into two phases. In the first phase, called input selection, the server and the client obtain a simple (additive) secret-sharing of the m selected items Xl. (That is, for 1 ~ j ~ m, the client and the server each obtain a random element from D, such that the pair of elements add to xij.) This should be done without revealing any information to either party. In the second phase, the parties may invoke any secure MPC protocol for computing the value of f ( x i ) from their shares.
This two-phase approach does not support strong security against a malicious client. Indeed, a malicious client may arbitrarily change its shares of x l before passing them as inputs to the MPC phase. Nonetheless, most of the protocols obtained in this section can be proved to satisfy our notion of weak security against a malicious client. Note that if the only type of cheating by a malicious client is the one described above, then this is intuitively clear: in such a case, the function f' computed by the client will be of the form f(zx Jr A), where A is the difference between the received vector of shares and the one passed to the MPC protocol. In general, however, one must also guarantee that both the input selection protocol and the MPC protocol support this notion of security.
The remainder of this section is organized as follows. In  subsections 3.3.1, 3.3.2, and 3.3.3 we describe three different approaches for implementing the input-selection phase. We refer the reader to Section 1.2 (and in particular to Table  1 ) for a comparison of these approaches. Finally, in Section 3.3.4 we present a light-weight protocol for computing a general arithmetic circuit. This protocol may be used for implementing the MPC phase of our protocols, namely securely computing f on the shared selected items, in the case where f is represented by an arithmetic circuit over a (possibly large) ring.
The first protocol for input selection
Let share-z~ denote a primitive which achieves a sharing of a single selected item. That is, share-x, has the following functionality: suppose that initially the server knows x and the client knows i; share-zi is a secure protocol which results in the server knowing a value a E D and the client knowing a value b 6 D such that a and b are random subject to the restriction that they add up to xi. To implement share-zi, the server picks a random a 6 D and prepares a "virtual database" l / = (zl -a . . . . . z , -a). The client then uses SPIR to find the value b = zi -a of the ith location.
Then to accomplish our input selection task, perform rrL invocations of share-xi, one for each i 6 I. The above protocol requires one round to complete. Together with a 1-round secure MPC protocol, it yields a 2-round SPFE protocol whose cost (both in communication and computation) is dominated by that of the ra invocations of SPIR(n, 1, D) plus the cost of MPC.
The second protocol for input selection
The previous input selection protocol, as well as the protocol from Section 3.2, requires m retrievals of I out of n items, from m different databases. For reasons of communication and computational efficiency, it may be highly desirable to replace this by a single retrieval of m out of n items.
To achieve this, we rely on ~n-wise independence. Let {Ps : [n] -~ D}ses be an rn-wise independent function family; that is, if s is chosen uniformly at random from S, then for any i~,... ,i,~ the random variable (P,(il),... , P~(i,,) ) is uniformly distributed over Din. s Then, a generic version of the second input selection protocol may proceed as follows. (1) The server picks a random s E S and computes a virtual database x' such that x~ = zi + P,(i); (2) The client uses a SPIR(n, re, D ) protocol to learn x~; (3) The parties engage in a secure MPC protocol outputting an additive sharing of P~(I) d__. ___, (P,(iz) ..... P,(i,=) ). That is, the server's input is s, the client's input is I, and the server and sit suffices for our purposes that the latter distribution be cornputationallll indistinguishable from uniform; however, our solutions do not utilize this relaxation.
It is easy to verify that the sum of the outputs a, b is indeed equal to xr. Note that since z~ is uniformly distributed over D '~, step 2 reveals nothing to the client. Since step 3 does not rely on step 2, both can be executed in parallel, and so the entire input selection protocol can potentially be implemented in one round.
We turn to the question of efficiency. The above protocol leaves two parameters unspecified: the function family {Ps} and the secure MPC protocol of step 3. Our efficient solutions will be obtained by letting {P,} be the family of degree-~ polynomials over a prime field F, where IF[ > n. That is, each s = (so,... , s,,-1) E F "~ naturally defines a degree-m polynomial Ps(Y) = so + sly +..
. + s,,-i Y "~-I.
We assume here that D = F and view the indices i# as dements of F.
We present two variants for the secure MPC protocol required in step 3. The first requires a single round, but incurs an ~n2~ additive communication overhead. The second reduces this communication overhead to m~, but does this at the cost of increasing the round complexity and weakening the (provable) security of the resultant protocol. Both variants utilize homomorphic encryption (see Section 2), which allows us to efficiently compute linear functions on a vector of encrypted values. 
The server outputs ( r l , . . . , r,~) and the client outputs the decryptions of the m encryptious sent by the server. S e c o n d v a r i a n t . (1) The server picks keys to a homomorphic encryption scheme as above, and sends the public key E to the client along with the m encryptions E ( s 0 ) , . . . , E(s,~-I ).
(2) The client picks a random mask r = ( r l , . . . ,r,,), and computes E ( Ps (it) -r t ) , . . . , E ( P= ( i,n ) -r ,~ ) . (This can be done, since each encrypted value is a fixed linear combination, depending on I, of the m coefficients sj and an entry from r.) It sends the m encryptions to the server. (3) The server outputs the decryptions of the rrt encryptions sent by the client, and the client outputs r.
The above two variants can viewed as two dual approaches for computing a matrix-vector product, where the first considers the product as a linear function of the matrix defined by the vector, and the second as a linear function of the vector defined by the matrix.
Efficiency. While the two variants significantly differ in their communication complexity, their computational complexity is similar:
Step 2 in both requires one of the parties to perform O(m 2) modular exponentiations. Vvrhen rr~ is large, this is very expensive. However, since F can be chosen to be roughly of size r=, the exponents can be made small (by using small-modulus homomorphic encryption [9] ). The computational overhead will be thus dominated by O(rc= 2 log r=) modular multiplications. Finally, while both variants seem to require one round, the communication pattern in the second is incompatible with that of the SPIR protocol. Consequently, the second input selection protocol requires 1.5 rounds to complete: a message from the server followed by a standard round.
Security. In contrast to the first protocol, the second cannot even be proved to be weakly secure against a malicious client. In fact, it is easy to construct a contrived (yet secure) encryption scheme which, when used in an SPFE protocol computing a simple function f, allows a malicious client to obtain the decryption key D. Consequently, in this protocol the client will be able to learn all ~ items zz. We note, however, that when using the above with natural homomorphic encryption candidates, it is plausible that the resultant SPFF protocol enjoys (heuristic) weak security against a malicious client. The protocol can be made provably secure by requiring the client to prove in zero-knowledge that it knows the function it applies to the encrypted values. However, this would result in a significant overhead to the efficiency of the protocol.
The Boolean case. As is, the SPFF protocol based on either of the above variants seems to require secure MPC over a field of size ~ n even in the default Boolean case. Since the best known 1-round secure MPC protocols do not generalize efficiently to arithmetic circuits, this may result in a consid- the polynomial family ~p,) as in the original protocols, but relies on a nearly-linear FFT-based algorithm for evaluating the polynomial P, on the points (ix,... , i,~). Unfortunately, both improvements do not seem to apply to practical choices of the parameters.
The third protocol for input selection
We present a third alternative to the implementation of the input selection phase. In comparison to the first variant of the previous protocol, its relative disadvantages are that it fails to give provable security against a malicious client and that it uses SPlR(n, vr~, ~), where ~ is of the length of a homomorphic encryption, instead of SPIR(n, m, log n). However, similarly to the second variant, its communication overhead is only linear in m, and its computational complexity is superior to both variants of the previous protocol.
The protocol, which is similar in spirit to a protocol from [20] , proceeds as follows. First, the server chooses keys for a homomorphic encryption scheme over D, sends the public key E to the client, and prepares (but does not send) encryptions E(zt) .... , E(~,). Next, the client uses SPlR(n, m, D)
to retrieve E(zit) .... , E (~:i,,,) . It picks random blinding elements rx,... ,r,n E D, computes E(xiy -rj), and sends these values back to the server. Finally, the server decrypts and outputs a i = ziy -ry, and the client outputs bj = ry.
The $PFE protocol obtained from this input selection protocol can be implemented in 2 rounds, by letting the client send its MPC message together with its second message of the input selection protocol. The complexity of the input selection protocol is dominated by that of SPIR(n, m, D).
Secure protocol for arithmetic circuits
In the second phase, called function evaluation, any secure MPC protocol can be used for evaluating f on the input shares. Yao's protocol, which is the best known protocol for the Boolean case, does not scale well to compute arithmetic circuits.
We present a light-weight secure MPC protocol for arithmetic circuits over a ring D = 7/.u. Its round complexity is proportional to the circuit (multiplicative) depth, and it requires a constant number of exponentiations per gate. While not providing fifll security (hence its efficiency), it can be proved to satisfy our notion of weak security against a malicions client, and can therefore be naturally combined with any of the input selection protocols in this section. The protocol is reminiscent of protocols described in [15, 1, 18, 
24].
The arithmetic circuit is evaluated gate by gate. Before evaluating each gate, the server holds a homomorphic encryption of the input values for the gate (where the encryption is under the client's key). At the end of the evaluation of the gate the server holds an encryption of the output value of the gate. The encrypted values are computationally hidden from the server. Furthermore, the protocol guarantees that both the client and the server learn nothing during the evaluation process. At the end of the protocol the server reveals the encryption of the output of the circuit. The client decrypts the value and outputs the result. We provide efficient constant round implementations for addition and multiplication gates.
The protocol begins with the client picking keys to a homomorphic encryption scheme over D = 7L~,, and sending the public key E to the server along with an encryption of its inputs. We describe procedures for evaluating modular addition and multiplication gates on encrypted values. That is, consider the following problem: The server holds an encryption of values vx, v2 E [0,... , u -1]. The parties wish to provide the server with an encryption of the value c = vl + v2 mod u or c = ~t x v2 rood u. The client should learn nothing from participating in the protocol. In the following, assume that all operations are performed rood u.
Evaluating an addition gate. Given E(~t),E(v~), the server computes the encoding of vl + v2 on its own by com-
puting E(vl + ~2) = E(vl). E(~2).
Evaluating a gate which multiplies by a value known to the server. Given E(v),a, the server computes the encoding of ~. a, by computing E(a. ~) = E(~) ~.
Evaluating a gate which multiplies by a value unknown to the server. Given E(vt),E(v~), we describe how the server uses the help of the client in order to obtain E(vl-v2). 
.
S T A T I S T I C A L F U N C T I O N S
In this section, we consider specific instances of the SPFE problem which are geared towards privately computing standard statistics on a selected data set. Wc discuss the applicability of our general solutions from previous sections to several statistical computation functions, and also present some direct constructions. Throughout most of this section we view the data items as integer-valued.
Average and variance. The sum ftmction is particularly important for statistical applications since it can capture several interesting statistical quantities. Indeed, learning the sum of m values is equivalent to learning their average. The variance of m values is a linear combination of their sum and the sum of their squares. Thus, given a 1-round SPFF protocol for the sum function, one can efficiently implement a 1-round SPFE protocol for a "package" combination of average and variance. The server stores x' = (x~,... ,z~) in addition to the original database. Upon receiving the client's queries, generated according to the sum protocol, it replies twice: once with the original database, and once with the database x'. Note that if the SPFE protocol is strongly secure against a malicious client, then so is the above protocol (since learning both the average and variance of the same set of items is equivalent to learning both their sum and the sum of their squares).
Efficiency of p r e v i o u s c o n s t r u c t i o n s . To efficiently solve the special case of SPFE where the function f is the sum function, we view the items as elements of a field F = g~, where u is an upper bound on the sum. Applying the generic approach of Section 3.1 (and utilizing the fact that f admits a degree-1 representation over F), we may get a ( t l o g n q-1)-server 1-round protocol (where t is the client privacy threshold), in which the communication consists of roughly tmlog 2 n field elements. The main disadvantages of this approach is the number of servers and the computation time of O(mn).
We turn to the single-server setting. The PSM-based construction of Section 3.2, while not efficiently scalable to general arithmetic circuits, can provide a fairly efficient solution in our special case of the sum function, as described in Example 1. However, this solution still requires m invocations of SPIR on m different databases, which is prohibitive when rn is large. To gain better efficiency, it is desirable to reduce the problem to a single invocation of a SPIR(n, m, *) primitive. This is achieved by the technique of Sections 3.3.2, 3.3.3. However, the round complexity of the resultant protocols will not be optimal, and they either incur a high computational overhead or require the application of SPIR on relatively long strings. A n efficient s o l u t i o n for t h e w e i g h t e d s u m f u n c t i o n . We now show a 1-round solution which avoids the above weaknesses of our general solutions. First, we relax the problem and allow the client to compute any selected linear combination of m items. We refer to this as the toeighted sum problem. Note that a useful feature of this relaxation is that it allows us to compute the weighted average and variance of the selected data set, where the weights can be freely chosen by the client.
Our protocol is similar to the first variant of the input selection protocol from Section 3.3.2. However, it relies on the linearity of the weighted sum function to achieve greater efficiency. As in the input selection protocol, the server picks a random degree-(rn -1) polynomial Ps over F with coefficients so,... , s,~-l, prepares a virtual database x' such that z~ = zi + Ps(i), and lets the client use SPIR(n, m, F) to learn x~. These alone are uniform and independent field elements. The next observation is that learning z~ together (i,,~) ). Note that since the ]/near combination protocol can be done in parallel to the SPIR protocol, the entire protocol requires only one round. The generalization to weighted sum is straightforward: by choosing different coefficients cA the client can learn an arbitrary linear combination of xix,... , xi.~. Moreover, by a counting argument every choice of co,... ,c,n-1 induces some valid linear combination of the selected items. This implies that even a malicious client cannot learn more than some linear combination of the selected items.
Efficiency. As noted above, the protocol can be implemented in one round. Its communication complexity is dominated by that of SPIR(n, m, F), where IF I should be larger than the maximum of n and (an upper bound on) the sum of the m largest items. Its computational complexity includes an additional overhead of O(m) modular exponentiations.
Counting frequencies. We end this section by briefly discussing an additional useful special case of private statistics: counting the number of occurrences, or frequency, of a chosen value or keyword in the selected data set. Let ~n be a keyword, taken from the data domain D. We embed D in a finite field F ----Z~ where u > ID]. Our function may be formally defined as f(yl . . . . , Y-~) = ~"~#' n_-I X~,(V#), where X~(Y) is 1 if w = y and is 0 otherwise.
Suppose that the client and the server already share the selected items xz in an additive way. This can be achieved in one round using our input selection protocols. Let a and b be the two shares of zx, held by the server and the client respectively. The protocol requires one additional round, and proceeds as follows: (1 Note that a malicious client can alter the m encrypted values it sends. However, this only has the effect of allowing it to compute a more general function, in which a different keyword is specified for each selected item.
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